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Sexually Transmitted Diseases: A Courtroom Epidemic
James B. Damiano

INTRODUCTION
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that there are
approximately 19 million new sexually transmitted disease (STD) infections each year. This
costs the U.S. health care system over $16 billion annually and costs individuals even more in
terms of acute and long-term health consequences.1 These remarkable figures necessitate a
reassessment of tort law's proper function in determining how to handle the impact on our
society and legal system, that sexually transmitted diseases cause, as this costly wave of sex
tort litigation sweeps across the nation. 2
Sexually transmitted diseases remain a major public health challenge in the U.S., and
the outrageous costs incurred by this epidemic are taking a heavy toll on not only the health
care system, but the legal system as well. The increase in the litigation filed by plaintiffs who
are seeking damages as a result of unknowingly being infected with a STD has been growing
over the past twenty years, and will likely continue to grow commensurate with the
proliferation of sexual disease.3
Despite the literature and public announcements circulated in this area outlining the
seriousness and prevalence of these diseases, many individuals take little heed and are reckless
in their actions, failing to take the proper prophylactic measures to avoid transmission to their

1

See http://www.cdc.gov/std/stats09/trends2009.pdf.
This paper will focus on more serious diseases that are either incurable or life threatening. Curable
diseases present issues of mootness and will not be addressed in this paper.
3
Deana A. Pollard, Sex Torts, 91 MINN. L. REV. 769, 793-94 (2007).
2

sexual partners.4 This has led to numerous instances where the courts have, in effect, been
asked to attach tort liability to the natural results of otherwise knowing and consensual sexual
relationships. To help shed some light on this area of tort law, the following hypothetical may
be helpful in illustrating the complexities that the courts are being presented with in this area of
tort litigation.
Anthony, a 21 year-old college senior gets invited to a friend’s dorm to enjoy a night of
wine and cheese to celebrate their upcoming graduation in May, 2009. While enjoying his
wine, he sets his eyes upon Maria, a stunning young woman majoring in pre-law and aspiring
to be an attorney. After obtaining some information about Maria, he approaches her and
initiates a conversation with her.

The conversation turns into the two of them mutually

deciding to become intimate with each other.
Before initiating any sexual intercourse, Maria, who always practices safe sex, asks
Anthony if he has any sexually transmitted diseases that he could infect her with. Anthony,
having never been tested, but honestly and reasonably believing he did not have an STD
replies, “None that I know of.”5 As a result of that discussion, they engaged in unprotected
sexual intercourse. Anthony based his belief on that fact that he had very few sexual partners
throughout college, and as far as he knew, his sexual partners also had very few sexual
partners.6 Maria was very conscious about the spread of disease and had been tested regularly

4

See M.A. Catchpole, Continuing Transmission of Sexually Transmitted Diseases Among Patients
Infected with HIV-1 Attending Genitourinary Medicine Clinics in England and Wales, 312 B.M.J. 539
(1996).
In these studies, a considerable proportion of patients infected with HIV-1 and a substantial numbers of
homosexual or bisexual men attending these clinics continue to practice unsafe sex despite being aware
of their infection with HIV-1.
5
Whether Anthony had a duty to “know” will be explored in Part II, infra.
6
Courts have attempted to determine whether a lack of knowledge is a valid defense. See Part III, infra.

1

in the past, all of which testing was negative. Anthony and Maria remained friends after
college, but had no further sexual relations after that one encounter.
In September, 2009, Maria began law school. However, because of her busy schedule,
she had not kept up with the regular STD testing that she had in the past. In addition to her
busy schedule, Maria did not feel the need to be tested because she did not have any other
sexual encounters since the last one with Anthony, in May, 2009. Maria finally made some
time to get tested in July, 2011. Expecting a normal result, Maria was shocked when her doctor
called her and informed her that her results came back positive for herpes. Her reaction
stemmed from the fact that she had no symptoms of any STD and that she hasn’t had any
sexual partners since Anthony.
Infuriated, Maria contacted Anthony and informed him that he gave her a sexually
transmitted disease and that she would be seeking restitution for the short and long term
damage this infection has, and will continue to cause her. Anthony, who was working as a
paralegal for a small law firm that specialized in personal injury litigation realized that it has
been over two years since they had any contact, and told Maria that she “didn’t stand a chance
because the statute of limitations on matters like this is two years and she waited too long!”7
After doing some research, Maria realized that the statute did, in fact, bar actions brought after
two years but wondered if there were any exceptions to the strict reading of the statute. She
was nervous and began to think it may have been her fault because she was negligent for
believing him and not requiring that he get tested before agreeing to engage in sexual
intercourse with him. Maria was concerned and asked herself, Was it her fault? Did she assume

7

Issues concerning the statute of limitations will be further explored in Part V, infra.
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the risk when she had sex with him?8 What can she do to protect herself, and where she would
even begin to look to find out. Other questions were also raised, such as, should Anthony have
known about his condition? and, “is it all, or any part, Anthony’s fault? Lastly, Maria was
concerned with the public humiliation she would bring upon herself and her family if she had to
bring this lawsuit into the eyes of the public court system?9
To help explain some of the questions raised throughout this scenario, and to establish
whether one sexual partner owes a duty to the other, the outline herein below is separated as
follows:10
a.

Part I explores recent statistical data gathered by the Centers for Disease Control

and Prevention in the rapidly growing area of Sexually Transmitted Diseases in America. 11
b.

Part II explains the current negligence paradigm, and why it is the most

frequently alleged claim.
c.

Part III examines some of the most commonly asserted defenses. In this section,

it is evident that courts are having a difficult time addressing these cases because many courts
are seeing them as a case of first impression.
d.

Part IV explains the overdue advances in the area of interspousal immunity and

presents an argument for a more uniform approach to be applied across the country.

8

The defense of assumption of risk is explored in Part III, infra.
The negative stigma associated with these diseases as well as the reluctance of Americans to get tested
is explored in Part I, infra.
10
This paper will simply focus on Sexually Transmitted Diseases and the tort law implications. This
paper will not address any criminal liability associated with such acts, including fraudulent
misrepresentation and battery, the most prevalent criminal charges in these types of cases.
11
The data in this section applies to the nation as a whole. No specific demographic was targeted in the
data provided by the Centers for Disease Control.
9
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e.

Part V addresses the various issues concerning the statute of limitations in this

area and presents a basis as to why a more liberal application of the doctrine would further the
goals of tort law.
In conclusion, the contention that the courts have failed to address this topic properly
will be propounded, as well as how this failure has fashioned a tort law system that is unable to
meet its ultimate goals.

BACKGROUND
I. A Brief Statistical Background On America’s Increasing STD Rates
Sexually transmitted diseases remain a veiled epidemic in the United States that present
enormous health and economic consequence to our nation and our society at large. Due to the
negative biological and social stigma associated with these diseases, many Americans are
reluctant to address sexual health issues, and as a result, avoid regular and proper testing.12 This
laissez faire attitude is the leading factor that cause Americans to remain oblivious of any
disease they have been exposed to or may be carrying. This ignorance leads people to believe
that this epidemic has no effect on them. However, all people have an interest in STD
prevention because all communities are impacted by STDs and all individuals directly, or
indirectly pay for the costs of these diseases. There are many obstacles to effective prevention
efforts, which includes confronting and remedying the reluctance of American society to
openly face and challenge issues surrounding STDs. It is also necessary that the court create a
uniform approach to encourage more socially responsible behavior. While the process of
preventing STDs must be a collaborative one, America should also utilize its court system to
12

Similar to Anthony above, one cannot assume they do not carry a disease based solely on their prior
sexual history of few partners.
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initiate a successful national initiative to confront and prevent STDs, as well as to protect
individuals who have been unknowingly infected by them.
To keep American’s informed of this public health outbreak, every year the CDC
publishes a report of national data on gonorrhea, chlamydia and syphilis.

In its report, 13 the

CDC based its data on state and local STD case reports from a variety of private and public
sources, the majority of which come from non-STD clinic settings, such as private physicians
and health maintenance organizations. CDC’s surveillance report includes data on the three
STDs that physicians are required to report to the agency including chlamydia, gonorrhea and
syphilis, which represent only a fraction of the true burden of STDs.14
In 2010, a total of 1,307,893 cases of sexually transmitted chlamydia infection were
reported to the CDC. This is the largest number of cases ever reported to CDC for any
condition and is an increase of 5.1% compared with the rate in 2009. Rates of reported
chlamydial infections among women have been increasing annually since the late 1980s, when
public programs for screening and treatment of women were first established. In addition to the
outrageous number of chlamydia reports, a total of 309,341 cases of gonorrhea and 13,774
cases of syphilis were reported to CDC.15 Although seemingly low numbers in comparison to
the number of sexually active Americans, from 2006 through 2010, syphilis rates increased at
an alarming 134% among those aged 20 to 24 years.16
13

Sexually Transmitted Disease Surveillance, 2010, See www.cdc.gov/std/stats [Hereinafter STD
Surveillance].
14
Although these diseases are in fact curable with various antibiotics and procedures, this paper will
focus only on incurable diseases. These numbers are designed to give you an accurate representation of
the only diseases that physicians are required to report. Other common STDs such as human
papillomavirus (HPV), genital warts, and genital herpes, are not reported to the CDC, and would not
reflect an accurate number.
15
Id.
16
Id.
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Even more startling is that the infection rates of STDs in the United States are estimated
to be between fifty and one-hundred times higher than the infection rates of other industrialized
nations.17 Despite the seriousness and prevalence of these diseases, many people continue to be
careless, and fail to avoid transmission to their sexual partners. 18 Until the sexual transmission
of diseases is reduced, many people who have contracted sexually transmitted diseases will
seek recompense in the courts from the people who infected them.19 The transmission of a
venereal disease through sexual intimacy can form the basis for tort liability between sexual
partners. As with most torts, the rationales for recognizing wrongful transmission claims
include "redressing the violation of important norms, compensating victims, and discouraging
unsafe behavior."20 Considering the epidemic proportions of sexually transmitted diseases,
discouraging unsafe behavior under the guise of public health should be a top priority for courts
in allowing these tortious transmission cases.

II. Negligence
Although many believe there is a moral and ethical duty to warn prospective sexual
partners about a contagious medial condition, the essential question for the courts to consider is
whether a person owes a legal duty to a sexual partner. Because there is no explicit answer
from the United States Supreme Court, negligence is frequently asserted as the cause of action
in cases for the transmission of a sexual disease.21 Negligence is conduct which falls below the
17

David J. Mack, Cleansing the System: A Fresh Approach to Liability for the Negligent or Fraudulent
Transmission of Sexually Transmitted Diseases, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 647 (1999).
18
See supra n. 4.
19
See Mack, supra note17.
20
Michelle Mekel, Kiss And Tell: Making the Case for the Tortious Transmission of Herpes and Human
Papillomavirus, 66 MO. L. REV. 929, 948 (2001).
21
Id. at 938.
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standard established by law for the protection of others against an unreasonable risk of harm.22
This conduct may consist either of an act, or an omission to act, when there is a duty to do so.23
An example of a failure to act may include failing to inform someone whom you may transmit
a disease to.24 Although a few states have recognized negligent transmission of sexual disease
since the late nineteenth or early twentieth century, courts all over the United States are now
addressing this as an issue of first impression leaving to ones imagination the question of
whether civil liability is appropriate for sexual disease transmission.25
As in any negligence action, the following four essential elements must be established
by a plaintiff in an action for the negligent transmission of a sexual or venereal disease:
1. the existence of a legal duty;
2. a breach of that duty;
3. injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by the breach; and
4. damages to the plaintiff.
Obviously, where there is no legal duty, there can be no actionable negligence.26
Therefore, a person who has a contagious STD, but abstains from any sexual activity, has no
duty to disclose his or her medical condition. By definition, the infected individual has taken
suitable safeguards to prevent any negligent transmission.

22

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
Id. at cmt. A.
24
As a practical matter, some jurisdictions allow a claim for both gross negligence as well as ordinary
negligence if, under state law, gross negligence is distinct tort from ordinary negligence. This section
will only discuss ordinary negligence, a valid claim in all jurisdictions, since gross negligence is not a
universally valid claim.
25
See Pollard, supra note 3, at 794.
26
AM. JUR. 2D, NEGLIGENCE § 89 (1989).
23
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Under the first prong, the notion of duty is founded on the responsibility each of us
bears to exercise due care to avoid unreasonable risks of harm to others. In B.N. v. K.K., a case
where a physician who knew he suffered from genital herpes entered into a sexual relationship
with a nurse without informing her of his condition, and the nurse contracted the disease. 27 The
court held, that one who knew he or she had a highly infectious disease and could readily
foresee the danger that the disease may be communicated to others, had a duty to take
reasonable precautions by warning others or avoiding contact with them, to avoid transmitting
the disease, and that a breach of this duty gave rise to a cause of action in negligence. 28 As a
consequence, the infected person has a duty to take reasonable precautions whether by warning
others or by avoiding contact with them to avoid transmitting the disease.29
Expanding on various courts opinions, Oklahoma in its 1997 decision established that
an infected person may also have a duty to a third party who may become infected through a
somewhat unforeseen chain of events. In Lockhart v. Loosen, a wife who had contracted
genital herpes from her husband brought a tort action against the woman with whom her
husband had engaged in an extramarital affair.30 The wife alleged that the defendant knew that
she had genital herpes when she engaged in the affair with her husband.31 The appellate court

27

538 A.2d 1175 (Md. 1988).
Id. at 1179.
29
Id.
30
Lockhart v. Loosen, 943 P.2d 1074 (Okla. 1997).
31
See also Meany v. Meany, 639 So. 2d 229 (La. 1994) In Meany, an action was brought by a former
wife against a former husband for the negligent transmittal of genital herpes. There was enough
evidence which led a jury to conclude that the defendant knew, or should have known that he was
putting his former wife at risk of venereal disease by sexual contact where there was undisputed
evidence that the defendant had contact with multiple sexual partners during a period of separation from
the plaintiff. The plaintiff's first symptoms of infection occurred after reconciliation with the defendant,
and when the plaintiff confronted the defendant with her diagnosis, the defendant disclosed that he had
28

8

affirmed on all advanced theories of liability except negligence where it held that an individual
who knows, or reasonably should know, that he or she has a sexually transmitted disease, and
who has sexual relations during the period when he or she is infectious, owes a duty to warn his
or her sexual partner of the contagion.32 The court added that such an individual also owes a
duty to warn identifiable third persons with whom the individual knows the partner is
copulating.33
In their reason, the court explained how negligence is based on the breach of a duty on
the part of one person to exercise care to protect another against injury, by failing to perform,
or improperly performing, such duty, as a result of which the latter sustains an injury.34 They
also explained that in the absence of such a showing, no liability can arise based on a claim of
negligence. Although a seemingly low threshold, one must prove that a legal duty did exist.35
Accordingly, people may be held liable for the negligent transmission of dangerous,
communicable diseases,36 and a cause of action thus exists for the negligent transmission of a
STD.37
However, in C.A.U. v. R.L., the Minnesota court, in an attempt to determine the
defendant's liability for transmitting the AIDS virus, held that the defendant's knowledge

experienced a problem with "dripping" for which he had sought medical attention but had failed to
inform her.
32
Id. at 235.
33
Id.
34
In the above hypothetical, Anthony was negligent for failing to, or improperly notifying Maria of his
STD.
35
See AM. JUR. 2D, NEGLIGENCE supra note 27, at § 82.
36
See C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); see also Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d
334 (Wyo. 1979).
37
McPherson v. McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043 (Me. 1998).
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consisted only of what he perceived at the time of his relationship with the plaintiff.38 In their
decision, they further held that the defendant was required only that his perception be
reasonable under the circumstances, as he was not expected to perceive what was not apparent
to him. They found that at that time, AIDS were not prevalent and that it would not have been
reasonable for the defendant to be on notice that he was at risk in transmitting the AIDS virus
based on articles which he had read two years earlier in a magazine and newspaper, and the fact
that he had a single homosexual experience.39 Accordingly, the court recognized and exception
and found that the defendant was not liable for transmitting the AIDS virus to his fiancée at that
time.40
In addition to the four basic prongs that must be met for an ordinary negligence claim,
some states require an additional element to have a successful claim for the negligent
transmission of a STD. These jurisdictions require the defendant had knowledge, or should
have known, that he or she had a contagious disease before having intercourse and transmitting
the disease to his or her sexual partner.41 The courts deem an individual to have a "reason to
know" of a particular disease if he or she has information that a person of reasonable
intelligence would infer that the fact in question exists, or that such person would govern his or
her conduct upon the assumption that such fact exists.42 They have found that one "should

38

See C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
Id.
40
Id.
41
Although various states require some concealment by the defendant, this is not a requirement in all
states and you will see below that there are numerous exceptions to this rule including assumption of the
risk and contributory negligence to name a few.
42
RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, at § 12 (1); see also, M.M.D. v. B.L.G., 467 N.W.2d 645 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1991) The court found that a reasonable person with recurring sores on the genitals, who also has
been told by a physician that a herpes culture may be advisable, should know there is a reasonable
possibility that herpes has been contracted, and that such an acne-type condition on the genitals could be
39

10

know" of a certain fact if a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the
fact in question in the performance of his or her duty to another.43 The courts, by requiring
defendants to only “reasonably believe," indicate that a person is on constructive notice when a
given fact or combination of facts exists, that would cause a reasonable person to be aware of
the possibility of spreading disease.44
Therefore, the courts have established that one who knows, or should know, that he or
she is infected with a sexually transmitted disease is under a duty to either abstain from sexual
contact with others, or, at least, to warn a potential sexual partner about this risk of infection
before engaging in a sexual relationship with that person.45 A breach of that duty will give rise
to cause of action for tortious transmittal of the disease.46
Accordingly, if the defendant's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to
another, the fact that the defendant neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the
harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent the defendant from being liable to the
plaintiff.47 In cases where there are issues of forseeability, a jury will often be used to
determine if the harm of the defendant’s acts were actually foreseeable. However, as a matter of
law, when the forseeability is clear, it is often times handled by the court. Typically one who
knows that he or she has highly infectious disease can readily foresee the danger that the
disease may be communicated to others with whom the infected person comes into contact, and
the issue of forseeability can be quickly dismissed.

communicated to others through sexual contact, and has a duty to avoid sexual contact, or at least to
inform potential sex partners about the genital sores and the physician's advice.
43
RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, at § 12 (2).
44
Id. at § 11.
45
Deuschle v. Jobe, 30 S.W.3d 215 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2000).
46
Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1989).
47
RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, at §§ 435 cmt. A, 435(1).
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III. Excuse or Defense?
An issue both plaintiffs and defendants face each day is the fact that the United States
has 50 states each with their own laws, rules, and regulations.48 Because each jurisdiction is
entitled to apply different rules, what may be a valid defense in one state, may only appear as
an inadequate excuse in another. This section will explore various defenses as well as some
asserted defenses that failed to meet the expectations of both the courts, and the jurors.

§ 1: Lack of Knowledge
Several jurisdictions have found an exception when the defendant is mistaken as to
having a sexual disease.49 In these cases, the defendant's conduct may not amount to an
intentional tort.50 This is also known as the "lack of knowledge" defense, which requires
defendants to adhere to a "reasonable" standard.51 For example, in C.A.U. v. R.L., the
Minnesota Court of Appeals found that a man had no duty to warn his sexual partner of the risk
of infection from AIDS because his contact with his sexual partner and the spread of the
disease occurred before any significant knowledge of AIDS was widespread.52
Similarly, in McPherson v. McPherson,53 a case in which a former wife sued her former
husband for negligence and assault and battery after she learned that the defendant engaged in
48

The cases in this section are designed to provided explanations of several common issues and asserted
defenses raised in STD cases. Note that the cases in this section are not applied universally nor are they
necessarily exclusive to the particular jurisdiction where the case originated.
49
This mistake must be based on a good-faith belief.
50
RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, at § 892B cmt. C.
51
The Lack of Knowledge defense is currently the most successful to a claim for the infliction of a
sexually transmitted disease.
52
C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
53
McPherson v. McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043 (Me. 1998).
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an extramarital affair and subsequently infected the plaintiff with the human papilloma virus.
Affirming the trial court's entry of judgment for the defendant, the appellate court held that,
while Maine recognized a cause of action for the negligent spread of a sexually transmitted
disease, the defendant, who was unaware that he was HPV-positive, was under no duty to
protect the plaintiff from infection,54 and that the plaintiff could not recover for assault and
battery where her sexual relations with the defendant were consensual.55

§ 2: Substantial Mistake and Invalid Consent
In some instances, a defendant may disclose a disease to a plaintiff. To the contrary, a
defendant may also represent that he does not have a disease by failing to disclose a disease.
However, if the defendant is aware that the plaintiff’s consent is given under a substantial
mistake, the defendant is not entitled to rely on that consent. This can occur when the plaintiff
is unaware of the extent the harm the intercourse can actually cause due to the defendant’s
failure to disclose a particular fact. This defense also raises the issue of invalid consent.
Invalid consent occurs when an individual is induced to consent “by a substantial mistake
concerning the nature of the invasion of his interests or the extent of the harm to be expected
from it and the mistake is known to the other or is induced by the other's misrepresentation,”
the consent is ineffective.56
This was the case in Kathleen K. v. Robert B., where the defendant relied on his limited
representation to the plaintiff that he did not have a venereal disease. The court held that by
deliberately taking advantage of a plaintiff's ignorance, the defendant takes his or her chances
54

You will see below a different jurisdictions opinion where the facts of the case were similar, yet the
outcome was entirely different.
55
McPherson v. McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043 (Me. 1998).
56
RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, at § 892B.
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that the consequences that the plaintiff does not expect will occur, and the defendant becomes
liable as if no consent had been given.57 The court also noted that if the defendant knows he or
she has a sexually transmitted disease, this limited representation is no defense to an action by
the plaintiff to recover damages for having contracted the disease from the defendant. 58 By
failing to fully disclose a disease, or the extent of a disease, a defendant surrenders his right to
an informed consent defense. Similarly, courts have rejected the defense of consent when it is
obtained by express fraudulent misrepresentation. Thus, it is these jurisdictions opinions that
the consent to intercourse should not bar recovery for a venereal infection because the consent
given goes to the act of intercourse, not to the harmful contamination.59

§ 3: Defendant’s Duty to Warn
Recently, Iowa dealt with the defendant’s duty to warn at both its Supreme Court and
Appellate Court. In its Appellate Court case of Rossiter v. Evans, the plaintiff sued the
defendant for infecting her with a sexually transmitted disease after telling her he was diseasefree.60 The plaintiff was soon thereafter diagnosed with both strains of the human
papillomavirus (HPV), one of which causes genital warts and the other cell abnormalities that
can lead to cervical cancer. She alleged that the defendant infected her during their 18-month
relationship and failed to warn her to take appropriate steps to protect herself from infection. 61
The defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence that he had, or should have known
that he had a sexually transmitted disease, and without such knowledge, had no duty to warn
57

Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Cal. Ct. Ap 1994).
Id.
59
Louis A. Alexander, Liability in Tort for the Sexual Transmission of Disease: Genital Herpes and the
Law, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 101, 128 (1984).
60
Rossiter v. Evans, 08-1815, 2009 WL 5125922 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009).
61
Id.
58
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the plaintiff or otherwise protect her from the transmission of these sexually transmitted
diseases.62
In drafting its opinion, the Iowa Appellate Court relied on its Supreme Courts opinion,
which had been published earlier that year in Thompson v. Kaczinski, where the justices found
that all that was required for an actionable claim of negligence was the existence of a duty to
conform to a standard of conduct to protect others.63 They also noted as with many negligence
cases, that an actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when his conduct creates a
risk of physical harm.64 Relying on this opinion, the court was not persuaded by the defense
offered by the defendant and the jury found that the defendant did not meet his duty of care;
resulting in one of the largest verdicts of its kind.65

§ 4: Assumption of Risk
During consensual intercourse, absent any fraud on the part of any party, the parties
involved often accept that they are equally responsible for whatever outcome may present
itself. However, a frequently asserted defense in these cases is assumption of the risk.66 In these

62

Id.
Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 834 (Iowa 2009).
64
Id. at 834.
65
The Iowa jury found for the plaintiff in the amount of $1.5 million. The verdict form shows that
$500,000 of Rossiter's compensatory damages were for future mental pain and suffering, while the
punitive damages were for Evans's willful and wanton disregard of her safety. This large verdict came
due to the fact that the jury rejected a battery claim which required the plaintiff to prove Evans
deliberately infected her. As mentioned above, had this case been heard in a different jurisdiction, the
outcome may have been drastically different.
66
In a typical negligence action, assumption of risk is a defense, which bars a plaintiff from recovery
against a negligent tortfeasor if the defendant can demonstrate that the plaintiff voluntarily and
knowingly assumed the risks at issue inherent to the dangerous activity in which he was participating at
the time of his injury. Asserting this defense has obvious evidentiary problems because often times in
these cases it’s one party’s word against the other.
63
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actions, the plaintiff must have known the risk existed, and been able to appreciate its
unreasonableness.67 Therefore, in cases dealing with the transmission of a STD, when a
plaintiff voluntarily contracts a STD from his or her sexual partner the plaintiff cannot recover
for that harm.68 For example, in Doe v. Roe, the court held that persons who engage in
unprotected sex, at a time of prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases, assume the risk of
contracting those diseases, and that those who engage in intimate relationships thus have a duty
to protect themselves adequately.69
Similarly, when an individual infected with a sexually transmitted disease accurately
informs his or her sexual partner of the affliction, and the partner understands the risk, and
voluntarily consents to sexual activity, the partner has expressly assumed the risk of contracting
the disease, and no liability should ensue for its transmission. Elements of the defense include
the plaintiff's understanding of, and voluntary exposure to, a risk in circumstances that indicate
a willingness to accept such risk.70
However, several courts have not accepted this defense even in cases where there is full
disclosure and consent. These courts stress that public policy argues against the application of
this doctrine, and these courts have distinguished between the consent to sexual activity and the
consent to infection with venereal disease.71 A Florida court denied the application of this
doctrine in a case where a former wife was infected with a sexually transmitted disease by her
former husband during a period of attempted reconciliation.72 The Appellate Court held that
while the issue was one of first impression in the state, consent to sexual intercourse did not
67

RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, at § 496D.
AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 26, at § 804.
69
Doe v. Roe, 598 N.Y.S.2d 678 (N.Y. 1993).
70
See Alexander, supra note 59, at 123.
71
Id. at 124, 127.
72
Hogan v. Tavzel, 660 So. 2d 350 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
68
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establish consent to be infected with a sexually transmitted disease, and therefore could not be
asserted as a defense to battery.73

§ 5: Contributory Negligence
It is well established that a defendant may be absolved from liability for a tort, if any
negligence or recklessness involved was that of the plaintiff's, thus barring the plaintiff from
recovering on the basis of his or her own contributory negligence. 74 This rule is equally
applicable to a plaintiff in a case concerning the transmission of a STD. In these cases, if the
plaintiff's negligence is a legally contributing cause of the plaintiff's harm, and there is no rule
restricting the plaintiff's responsibility for it, the plaintiff’s claim may be denied.75
Contributory negligence involves acting in such a way that a person of ordinary
prudence would not do, or the failure to do something that a person of ordinary prudence would
do, under the circumstances, to protect himself or herself from harm. Given the prevalence of
sexually transmitted diseases in the general population, some may argue that a person who
decides to enter into a sexual relationship should be expected to take reasonable precautions to
avoid contracting the disease, at least to the point of questioning the partner in the relationship
about the possibility of contracting the disease. No legal duty currently exists, however, which
requires a person to question another about the state of his or her health.76 Additionally,
whether an individual takes adequate measures to avoid transmitting a disease is currently an
issue for the trier of fact.77
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IV. Interspousal Immunity No Longer Applies To STDs
Interspousal immunity historically barred tort claims brought by one spouse against
another.78 Dating back centuries to common law, the doctrine of interspousal immunity was
fashioned in accordance with the perception that a husband and wife were one legal entity,
often times because it was perceived that a woman was the property of her husband. This
archaic belief discouraged courts from entertaining these claims for tort against a husband or
wife, finding it “morally and conceptually objectionable."79 In addition, the courts rationale
rested on the theory that allowing suits between spouses would “clog courts with trivial suits,
disrupt family harmony and result in collusive claims.”80 For example, in Bandfield v.
Bandfield, a wife sued her former husband for infecting her during marriage with an incurable
sexually transmitted disease.81 In this 1898 decision, the Michigan Supreme Court refused to
permit the wife to maintain the suit, stating that such an action “would be another step to
destroy the sacred relation of man and wife.”82
However, numerous jurisdictions have revisited this issue since that time, the majority
of which no longer bar sexual torts committed by ones spouse.83 It wasn’t until 1961 when the
New Jersey Supreme Court ruled with the increasing minority of courts that began to abandon
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complete interspousal immunity. The court, in its paramount decision, held that the surviving
widow who was injured by the negligent driving of her deceased husband was entitled to bring
an action against his estate.84 In its decision, the court noted that “the negligent infliction of
injury by a husband upon his wife is a wrongful act” and that “it does not lose this quality
merely because the wife is prohibited by the common law doctrine from enforcing liability for
her damage.”85
Since that time, New Jersey has reached the issue of interspousal immunity on several
more occasions.86 In one instance, the court held that it was unconscionable that a person could
escape liability for infecting a spouse with genital herpes or other sexually transmitted diseases
by merely claiming that transmission occurred during the privileged sexual relations of
marriage.87 The court logically reasoned that the defendant-husband could not simultaneously
breach his marital relationship by engaging in extramarital intercourse, and then claim marital
immunity for the consequences of his intentional misconduct.88 In these cases, the New Jersey
courts traced the evolution of the interspousal immunity doctrine, where in its decisions it
completely abandoned the doctrine of immunity with respect to interspousal torts with certain
limited exceptions.
Within the past few decades, numerous jurisdictions have looked to New Jersey’s
holdings when confronting the controversial issue concerning the transmission of a sexually
transmitted disease during a marriage. For example, relying on New Jersey’s resolution, the
New York court in its 1986 decision in Maharam v. Maharam, found that the plaintiff-former
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wife, could seek compensatory and punitive damages from her former husband for alleged
wrongful transmission of incurable genital herpes.89 Prior to this decision, New York relied on
the historical doctrine of interspousal immunity and would likely have dismissed the claim.
Simultaneously, the Supreme Court of Missouri was faced with a similar issue where a
wife alleged that during the course of the parties marriage, her husband had negligently
infected her with herpes.90 Relying on New Jersey’s decision, the Missouri court justices
reasoned that it was not beyond the ability of the courts to, on a case-by-case basis, adjust the
standard of care between married persons.91 It is evident that by doing so, the courts can better
address the claims before them before reaching any predetermined conclusions.
While in recent times interspousal immunity across the country remains far from
consistent, the courts have overwhelmingly disfavored this historic doctrine. The majority of
these states have based their decision on the notion that there is no reason that the types of
lawsuits historically prohibited by this doctrine, would create unwarranted marital
disharmony.92
Although interspousal immunity began as a way of encouraging spousal harmony and
preventing people from having to condemn, or being condemned by their spouses, the courts
have shown that despite its survival in varying forms, interspousal immunity is no longer the
doctrinal monolith it once was years ago.
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V. Statute of Limitations
One of the most difficult questions presented in a case dealing with the transmission of
a sexually transmitted disease has to do with the application of the statute of limitations as it
relates to a plaintiff’s claim for negligence.93 Often times this defense is difficult to both prove
and overcome, primarily because several venereal diseases have an incubation period and can
lie dormant for an extended period of time. 94 Because of their latent effects, these diseases can
remain undetected to plaintiffs for a number of years.95 Jurisdictions have taken various
approaches in interpreting these statutes; some interpreting the statute broadly and looking to
the reason the statute was created, while others apply it strictly, leading to splits throughout the
country.
Typically issues arise with the statute of limitations when a plaintiff simply does not
bring the action in a timely manner, or miss a filing deadline.96 In such instances, courts have
typically not tolled97 statutes of limitations in tortious transmission cases.98 Following this strict
adherence, numerous jurisdictions have found that in a claim for the negligent transmission of a
sexually transmitted disease, the statute of limitations began to run at the time of injury. For
example, the Texas Appellate Court found that the statute of limitations barred a wife's suit
against her husband for personal injuries resulting from the husband's negligent transmission of
93
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genital herpes to the wife because the right to sue for negligence occurs on the date the legal
injury occurs.99
Similarly, Wyoming found in Duke v. Housen, that the defendant escaped liability for
negligently transmitting gonorrhea to a female friend, but only because the statute of limitations
had run.100 The court felt that the cause of action arose when the defendant first had sexual
intercourse with the plaintiff. The court noted that the statute of limitations began to run at the
moment the defendant introduced into the body of the plaintiff the disease of gonorrhea. The
court held that there was no question that under the law that the defendant was guilty of a
tortious act of negligence, and the plaintiff was injured by the transmission of the disease.
However, the court felt it was the initial exchange between where the disease was placed in her
body, that the statute of limitations began to run, finding no exception to the statute.101
In its reasoning, the court stated that statutes of limitation have long been a part of the
jurisprudence of the United States,102 finding that the statute of limitations is a pragmatic
device to save courts from stale claims, and spare citizens from having to defend from these
claims when memories have faded and evidence is lost.103 Wyoming relied on its case law and
held that statutes of limitation are arbitrary by their very nature and they are not judicially made
but represent legislative and public policy controlling the right to litigate.104 The court reasoned
that the statutes operate against even the most meritorious of claims and courts have no right to
deny their application.105
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Likewise, the Minnesota Court of Appeals found that the two-year statute of limitations
on the husband's claims were not tolled during the time when he and his wife were married.106
In this case, a husband brought an action against a former wife, where he alleged that she had
negligently, intentionally, and fraudulently infected him with genital herpes. The court held
that the judgment entered in the dissolution action did not bar the husband from maintaining
claims against his former wife under doctrine of issue preclusion, and by failing to do so,
waived his right.
On the other hand, various jurisdictions have found that a liberal application of the
statute of limitations was better suited. These courts have acknowledged that a primary purpose
behind statutes of limitation is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time, thus allowing the opposing party a fair opportunity to defend.107 This entices litigants to
pursue their causes of action diligently to prevent the litigation of stale claims and aids in
weeding out stagnant and possibly frivolous or vexatious claims.
In order to equitably deal with the cases before them, these liberal courts looked to the
Legislatures intention when drafting the statute. They found that the Legislature has not
defined in the statute of limitations when a cause of action "shall have accrued," and the matter
has therefore been left entirely to judicial interpretation and administration.108 Therefore, these
jurisdictions have found that the question at hand has changed. These jurisdictions now inquire
whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the considerations are such that a
plaintiff should be regarded as having been “prevented” from filing his charges in timely
fashion, and the statute of limitations tolled during that period.
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The Supreme Court of the United States once held that “(s)tatutes of limitations are
primarily designed to assure fairness to defendants,” and that the right to recovery would be
“outweighed” where “a plaintiff has not slept on his rights but, rather, has been prevented from
asserting them.”109 The Supreme Court further noted, “(t)he filing (of a lawsuit) itself shows the
proper diligence on the part of the plaintiff which statutes of limitation were intended to
insure.”110 In adherence with the Supreme Courts decision, these liberal courts began to apply
the “discovery rule,” a limited exception to the statute of limitations.
The discovery rule was first announced in Fernandi v. Strully, a medical malpractice
case.111 It provides that the statute of limitations begins to run when the injury is discovered, or
in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, the injury should have been discovered. The
rule responds to the unfairness of requiring a plaintiff sue to vindicate a non-existent wrong, at
a time when injury is unknown and unknowable.112
For example, in Fernandi, during the course of an operation, a medical wing nut had
been negligently left in the plaintiff's abdomen. It was not discovered until more than two years
thereafter, in excess of the strict reading of the statute of limitations. In its decision, the court
held that the two-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until the plaintiff knew or had
reason to know of the existence of the foreign object.113
While Fernandi, expressly confined the discovery rule to foreign body malpractice
actions, subsequent decisions have gone much further and have acknowledged the relevance of
the doctrine whenever equity and justice have seemed to call for its application, including those
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concerning the transmission of a sexually transmitted disease. In such cases, New Jersey courts
have found it difficult to apply strictly a statutory period of limitations without considering
conscientiously the circumstances of the individual case and assessing the Legislature's
objective in prescribing the time limitation as related to the particular claim.114
When faced with applying the discovery rule to the transmission of a venereal disease,
New York similarly found that the diagnosis of a wife's sexually transmitted disease, as a
matter of law, constituted sufficient knowledge to trigger the discovery rule and begin the
statute of limitations period for an actual claim against her husband. 115 In this case, the statute
of limitations tolled until the date she was diagnosed, the first instance she knew, or had reason
to know of the disease.
Although various courts have been liberal in their application of the statute of
limitations, many draw a fine line in order to ensure they do not to overstep the Legislatures
purpose of the statute. For example, the Tennessee Appellate Court in Potts v. Celotex, found
that the discovery rule only applies in cases where the plaintiff does not, and cannot reasonably
be expected to discover the harm giving rise to the cause of action.116 The court explained that
the rule only tolls the statute of limitations as long as the plaintiff had no knowledge of the
injury to the extent that a reasonable person would not have known.117 This requirement that a
plaintiff exercise “reasonable care and diligence” is flexible, yet consistent with the
Legislatures purpose for employing the statutes of limitations.
A final defense a plaintiff may raise in response to the statute of limitations is that the
defendant's fraudulent behavior caused the statute of limitations to run. An example of this
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occurred when a husband's failure to admit that he had infected his wife with genital herpes was
in fact a false representation. The court found that the husband and wife had a confidential
relationship, and the wife was entitled to rely on the husband's denial.118 The court found that
based on this relationship, the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions could
be tolled.
These exceptions to the strict adherence of the statute of limitations are essentially rules
of equity, and like so many other equitable exceptions, have been developed as a means of
mitigating the often harsh and unjust results that flow from a rigid and automatic adherence to a
strict rule of law. On its face, it appears inequitable that an injured person who is unaware that
he has a cause of action, should be denied his day in court solely because of fraud or his
ignorance, if he himself had done no wrong. However, often times, this incorrectly seems to be
the result when courts strictly apply decade old rules created by the Legislature. In these cases,
it may be best for public policy to encourage courts to turn to the purpose of the statute in order
to determine the statute of limitations.

CONCLUSION
It seems the most successful defense across the nation is the “I did not know I had it”
defense. Not only is this current negligence paradigm failing to deter irresponsible sexual
behavior, but it actually discourages sexually active individuals from getting tested, because by
avoiding testing, they also avoid any proof of knowledge of their disease.119 This “caveat
emptor” standard in sex tort actions that has emerged fails to discourage irresponsible sexual

118
119

Beller v. Tilbrook, 571 S.E.2d 735 (Ga. 2002).
See Pollard, supra note 3.

26

practices and has largely contributed to the major epidemic of STDs that has developed in the
United States over the last thirty years.120
Many courts are allowing a defendant’s ignorance to shield him or her from liability, in
direct contradiction to the public policy designed to protect the majority as a whole. Rather than
giving defendants a defense based on their own ignorance, the courts should hold these disease
perpetrators accountable for their harm. By increasing the threshold that defendants must meet,
and by adopting a firmer standard, courts could encourage potential disease perpetrators to be
tested and behave responsibly to avoid disease transmission.121 To reach this ultimate goal,
America could use its judicial system to develop a legal standard consistent with that of its
social norms.
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